MULLAH SADR AND IBN SINA COMPARATIVE VIEW ON HUMAN SOUL

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ABSTRACT
The human soul has been the subject of incredible debate since the early rise of development. Its reality is scrutinized, its connection with the body is put under scrutiny and various other related issues have been talked about. Numerous scholars, researchers, therapists and scientists have endeavored to discover sensible answers. In this section the point is to present and break down the imperative considerations on this issue. This investigation starts with a presentation of the thoughts of a portion of the antiquated philosophers" whose takes a shot at the spirit and the soul we could discover. The point is to talk about a portion of the primary savants who have communicated thoughts on the spirit and the soul. In the meantime endeavors have been made to allude to some cutting edge mental thoughts; some of these have been specified in a compressed frame to acclimate the pursuer with the sorts of current mental perspectives on the spirit.

IBN SINA'S DEFINITION
The origin of actions which are not monotonous and not non-voluntary is so called the soul.

MULLAH SADRA DEFINITION
The soul which is influenced by the body but the body itself has no consciousness and finally the spirit.

Mulla Sadra withdraws from Ibn Sina on some mental focuses, for example, the unending length of time and crestedness of the soul the superfluity of the inventive power and the compelling part of the spirit in connection to its resources through which it exists in all its uniqueness!

Ibn Sina in some of his works trusted that the term; soul; does not allude to the substance of the spirit in that capacity yet to the spirit as it identifies with the body and organs considering it as something which bears a relationship to issue and therefore to developments he takes the body to be a component in the spirit's definition and says following Aristotle that the spirit is the shape or the primary flawlessness of the body

It is important to specify that despite the fact that Mulla Sandra's brain science covers a huge landscape including the vegetative and animal souls I have restricted in this examination to the instance of the human soul.

KEY WORDS: Soul, Spirit, Body, Vegetative soul, Animal soul.
Talking about the spirit and the mind rationalists have customarily proposed two essential introductions. Some trust that psyche and soul are similar, others that brain is a piece of the spirit. A third gathering recommends that the psyche and the spirit are altogether extraordinary, and what in certainty exists is mind portrayed by insightfulness and will. While logicians have demanded the presence of the spirit as something which can make due after the demise of the body freely or better to state without a human body present day safeguards of then idea of the brain keep up the presence of the psyche as something which is not everlasting but rather described by judgment and will.

When we talk about "soul" in the feeling of profound science, the possibility of internal quality, of inward experience, is constantly bound up with this idea. Furthermore, when we discuss "soul" with reference to our general surroundings, we are evident that in all that we can see or with which we can be stood up to, there is a sign of soul. Man would get himself associated with an interesting self-inconsistency were he not to underestimate the nearness of soul in every one of the marvels of presence around him. Without falling into sad self-logical inconsistency, no one can have a clever handle of the outside world unless he concedes that what he in the end finds in his own soul concerning this outer world — the ideas and thoughts he procures so as to comprehend external marvels — has something to do with the things themselves. On the off chance that when a man trusts he has taken in anything from the ideas he has framed about the things of the external world, he won't concede that there lives in these ideas something that is contained in the things themselves, he can never progress to learning — on the off chance that he is to be consistent with himself and comprehend the idea of his own demonstrations of comprehension. Only he can talk about information in the genuine sense who says to himself: "What I can at last find and hold, what I can convey to acknowledgment in my soul in demonstrations of learning, must be contained, principally, in the things themselves. Furthermore, seeing that I take something into my soul from the things of the world, regardless of to which kingdom they have a place; at that point in all kingdoms I should assume the presence of soul."

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

As for the immortality of the soul, Ibn-Sina rejects the exclusivism of al-Farabi who said that the intellect becomes immaterial by taking on intelligible forms and that ignorant souls will be annihilated. Opting for the opinion of Themistius, he simply says that the intellect of man survives death. "The soul without the body is the true man. Death is only the soul abandoning its instruments." Ibn-Sina presents two arguments to show that everyone has an immortal soul.
The first is the soul's experience of its own activity as being different from that of the body. Ibn-Sina supposes that if someone were in a void without any exterior sensation, his soul would nevertheless be conscious of itself. (He does not think here of the activity of the internal senses and the impossibility of self-consciousness without consciousness of something intelligible, normally through sensation.) Thus he concludes that the soul is a substance complete in itself, independent of the body, but which influences the body, especially by its emotions, much more than the body influences the soul.

The second argument is that the intellect, as a receptacle of intelligible forms, should itself be immaterial and immortal. Since it does not use the body as an organ, the intellect is independent of it and can be separated from it. This is the classic argument of Aristotle and the scholastics. The principle of this argument is that, besides our knowledge of sensible singulars, we know the essences of things in an intelligible and universal way. The intelligibility of things in our knowledge is not individualized by matter, however is otherworldly. This otherworldly protest is the realization of the judgment either in a habitual way (like memory) or in a real way. Yet, act compares with power. In the event that the demonstration is profound, the strength moreover should be otherworldly. The human keenness and soul are consequently profound and by that reality eternal.

Mulla Sadra in genuine feeling of the word, was a standout amongst the most significantly unique and powerful scholars ever. He is respected as "Plato of his circumstances" (Aflatun Zamanih). His part and logical circumstance is very reluctantly model and trans-authentic. Some of Sadra's last admirers feel that he speaks to the "most genuine" of all logic and the apogee of all Islamic philosophical idea. He has truly turned into the best image of Persian scholarly defense and presentations an "excessively critical soul" all through his productive academic vocation. He incorporated every one of the streams of theory of his opportunity. Besides, this combination was not achieved by "negligible compromise" and shallow bargain, yet on the premise of a philosophical standard which he both propounded and extended surprisingly.

As we as a whole know, the sign of a unique and incredible scholar is to find an "ace thought" which incorporates the arrangement of age-old issues that have vexed human personalities. Furthermore, Mulla Sadra found this standard in the "primodiality of presence" and its limitless "precise vagueness" (asalat al-wujud wa tashkik). Sadra connected this rule to the entire scope of the issues of Islamic theory, i.e. the idea of God, the nature of the world, and man's tendency and predetermination. Therefore Sadra began his philosophical talk with this guideline and after that endeavored to take care of every philosophical issue likewise.
In such manner, he talked about the accompanying issues:

1. Internal and outer presence
2. Eternal and middle person being
3. Being for itself and being for others
4. Necessary and conceivable being
5. Potential and genuine being
6. Eternal and made being
7. Intelligible and insights

Mulla Sadra inhaled another life into the dead assemblage of reasoning and added new measurements to its substance. He accommodated prevail upon instinct and religious law. He used judicious contentions, mysterious experiences and religious infusions in his mission for issues divine. In spite of the fact that this pattern is clear in al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, Shaykh al-Ishraq, Shamsuddin Tarkah and Khawaja Nasir al-Din Tusi, yet the credit goes to Sadra for having accommodated these domains of information and perception in a precise and immaculate way.

Mulla Sadra's philosophical framework is exceptionally unique. Be that as it may, it owes an impressive obligation to prior schools of thought, especially to, religious philosophy, Ismailism, Ibn Sina's transcendentalism, Ibn 'Arabi's Sufism when all is said in done, the Ishraqi reasoning of Shahab al-Din Yahya Suhrawardi, and the school of Isfahan. To these Mulla Sadra included a few unique teachings, remarkably few of which are as per the following:

1. The essential reality of presence (wujud) against quiddity (mahiyya)
2. The Unity of mind and understandable (al-stick' bayn al 'aqil wal-m'aqil)
3. The development of all creatures in their substances and also in their qualities (harakat al-jawhariyyah)

It is very defended to guarantee that Sadra accomplished that blend of science and disclosure in the light of gnosis and in the general point of view of Islam, towards which Farabi and Ibn Sina have pointed and which Ghazzali, Suhrawardi and different sages stretching out from the Saljuk to the Safavid period had looked to accomplish.

He orchestrated and brought together the three ways which prompt Truth i.e. disclosure, normal show and refinement of the spirit, which at last guide us to brightening.

Be that as it may, Sadra had awesome interest for Ibn Sina's theory with which we will bargain in the prospective pages in detail. In any case, it doesn't imply that he has not scrutinized him by any means. Sadra has, for instance, deciphered Ibn Sina's principle of insights affected by Ibn 'Arabi as
concrete existents, lifting these from the domain of possibility and making them parts of the God head and His Attributes.

Subsequently we see that the all the more magically situated thoughts of Ibn Sina, which had effectively discovered a home in the obscure works of Ghazzali, likewise bit by bit trucified in Sufi circles until the point that they were at long last consolidated in a created frame in Ibn 'Arabi’s School. The three strands of thought, consolidated by Sadra to yield a fabulous union are the Peripatetic custom of Ibn Sina, Illuminations convention of al-Suhrawardi and Ibn 'Arabi's theosophy.

Of the three experts, Ibn Sina is the most imperative. His teaching constitutes the floor or the establishment whereupon all exchanges occur. Ibn Sina built an undeniable philosophical framework on an Aristotelian neo-Platonic premise, fulfilling both the logical and religious requests. He set the motivation before Sadra relating to the dialog in every one of the fields, similar to power, hypothesis of information, and religious philosophy. Sadra scrutinizes him, changes him, bolsters him and even looks for help from some of his announcements for his own particular impossible to miss convention like the truth of presence and a mindlessness of embodiments. Alternate issues about which we are certain that the impact of Ibn Sina is exceptionally obvious resemble the regulation of causation; the hypothesis of hard datum confirmation (which basically is an indistinguishable contention from Ibn Sina’s) and the issue of wonders. Sadra related causation of unexpected by the important Being and different principles to his regulation of considerable development.

He acquired from Ibn Sina the evidence of specific supernatural occurrences demonstrating the strength of the spirit on the body. As respects Ibn Sina’s dissent of supreme recognizable proof of the judgment and the understandable, he was extremely basic, while as Sadra is far entire character of the acumen and the comprehensible as specified before.

In the issues of eschatology and restoration, Sadra is firmly associated with the perspectives of Ibn Sina. Despite the fact that the spirit is just a potential insightfulness toward the start of its vocation, it's all things considered an irrelevant profound substance fit for the body as indicated by Sadra. Be that as it may, Sadra rejects Ibn Sina's idea that the spirit is a social idea and not a considerable one. For Sadra, divine souls are on a fundamental level, as much entelechies of their bodies as natural souls. Sadra constructs his guideline of rise with respect to generous change (ittisal al-jawhariyya). Soul is substantial in its beginning, however profound in its survival (jismaniyyat al huduth ruhaniyyat al-baqa), however soul develops on the premise of issue, yet can't be completely material as rise requires that the new be of a larger amount. The matter of the body is utilized as the instrument, and is the main instrument to venture out the material to the profound domain (malakut).
As per Ibn Sina, the term soul applies to a connection and not to a substance. In this manner, it is broad to the spirit when it is considered as a substance by Ibn Sina, hence he denied physical restoration.

Mulla Sadra deliberately takes after the synopsis of the forces and levels of the spirit as displayed by Ibn Sina, yet with a few adjustments. He in his works holds the vast majority of the formal refinement of Ibn Sina's facultative brain research. In any case, he embeds them inside a fundamentally adjusted ontological structure that mirrors the altogether different source and expectations of his essential worry with the subject.

As indicated by Sadra in this world, however the body is always in movement, despite everything it continues as before body. So likewise in the hereafter the body keeps its personality despite the fact that it has changed in a general sense, as, it is not any more a material body. He expresses that the body as it will be revived, will be indistinguishably the same as this body, with the exception of that it will be material. The main contrast and the critical one, is that Sadra lays his teaching on the premise of his rule of substantive development (harakat al-jawahariyya) and his hypothesis of the world pictures "which has its foundations in both Ghazzali and Ibn Sina, and Sadra with every one of his prerequisites is essentially obligated to them". In any case, the rule of substantive development is Sadra's own.

Sadra claims that even Ibn Sina was not ready to comprehend the "being of structures". It was Sadra himself among the favored group, "somebody", to remedy deviations and contortions about the issue. Sadra does not put stock in the transmigration of soul and calls it outlandish and he says that human restoration in the otherworldly body is really happening.

As per Sadra, human soul is the snappiest of produced things with respect to the change to the physical and intelective modalities of being. It is the finish of the universe of sensible things and the start of the otherworldly world, the intersection of mortal and profound things, toward the end in human reality and the first in the profound ones.

The world which will be here after life, is partitioned into a "sensible garden", containing the felicities of the favor, similar to sustenance, drink, marriage, exotic longing, and intercourse and so forth and a "sensible damnation" containing the discipline of the pitiful, including hellfire torments, serpents, and scorpions. Sadra portrayed the view purpose of a gathering of individuals that the spirit of the devout and self-denial will end up plainly associated after death with a body made out of vapor and smoke in the climate and accomplish a kind of envisioned joy, and the pitiable similarly achieve their discipline along these lines. Ibn Sina, Sadra lets us know, depicted it as not a rash guess
that the hypothesis of vaporous body be amended by setting that substrate rather in the body of the sky, which Ibn Sina detailed this view with respect to a specific educated man.

Regardless, Ibn Sina's announcements in al-Shifa and al-Najat are vague if not out properly opposing. He appears to keep up that there is real revival and interminability to insignificant soul. The uncertainty appears to be considered and utilized as a defensive gadget against charges of irreligion. A cautious perusing of the mental parts of these two works will demonstrate that his framework can't permit a precept of real restoration. An exceptionally unequivocal foreswearing of real revival is to be found in a short treatise called Risalah al-adwahiyyiah fi amr al-ma'ad, which as its title proposes, was composed only on his origination of the great beyond. Ghazzali’s composition and nullification of Ibn Sina's hypothesis on real revival are for the most part in light of this short treatise. Yet, this hypothesis can be discredited, all things considered, if Ibn Sina’s perspectives are profoundly investigated in detail. Ibn Sina has not out properly dismissed mortal revival in the life in the future for a wide range of individuals. He has separated the salvation in the life from this point forward death in three degrees or states, as the salvation involves either consummation in information and practice, or deficiency in both of these two, a total in one and inadequacy in the other. The third state is additionally isolated into two sections, it is possible that it might be finished in information and deficient by and by or tight clamp versa. He separated it facilitate into two assortments. That it might be finished in information, yet deficient by and by or the other way around. Thereafter he says:

The conditions of the selves will be reviewed in like manner to the division which has been made in the Qur’an. The Qur’an says:

"What’s more, ye should be dealt with into three classes. At that point (there will be) the colleagues of the Right Hand. What will be the allies of the Right Hand and the associates of the left hand, what will be the sidekicks of the left Hand" After wards Allah says: "And those Foremost (in confidence) will be premier (in the Hereafter). There will be those Nearest to Allah" (al-Qur’an 7:11)

Ibn Sina proceeds subsequent to citing these Qur’anic verses: The general population knowledgeable in information and built up by and by are the individuals who have been called as "the chief" (sabiqun), and they merit the most noteworthy or the highest stage in the heaven loaded with joys. These individuals are related from the three universes to the universe of mind and reliably abstain from the real liberalities in this world. They are, consequently, the principal, and will be positioned in the highest stages in the heaven.
"The partners of the correct hand will be positioned at the centre stage, which dispose of the worries of this passing world and are adjusted to the universe of sky, stay unaffected by the contamination of the exceptional world."

"The mates of the left hand will be doomed in the place of devastation, where they won't request a solitary tirelessness, yet complex." These are the three conditions of the spirit in the life henceforth, which Ibn Sina has surmised from the Qur'anic verses, however the impact of Plato with regards to the principal state is still there, which shows the greatness of soul (and its lack of approachability from the real concerns) yet at the same time he acknowledges that there are exotic delights from different heavenly sustenance, and assortments of the substance of fowls and so forth in favour of the general population of the centre state. Here, as well, he doesn't appear without some undercover impact from Platonic perspectives, particularly when he guarantees that the general population of the centre state will be raised to the level of "quswa" by their endeavors to cleanse themselves from material viewpoints to the conceivable degree.

Ibn Sina admits that the general population of the most reduced stage will be given real disciplines too. Along these lines Ibn Sina does not deny real restoration in all cases, but rather just in few cases with connection to just couple of individuals. In this way Ibn Sina, acknowledges that few individuals will get substantial revival, while as others might be restored profoundly. He, and no more keeps up that the delights of the life henceforth are far prevalent than the physical joys of this ordinary world

Conclusion:

Going past Ibn Sina and different past Muslim savants who took after Aristotle in ascribing superfluity just to all-inclusive brains Mulla Sadra stated that the staff of creative ability is additionally a given interminable and free existent with respect to this precept he took after certain Sufi and lessons that set up an inverse school of thought.

Then again one may take note of a specific irregularity in Ibn Sina words wherein he expresses that the spirit is the principal flawlessness of the body which requires conceding being structure for; first flawlessness; is something that makes matter be realized. In this way its connection to the body can’t take after that of a commander to a ship which is two autonomous existents. Nobody considers the commander as the; primary flawlessness; of the ship yet despite what might be expected he considers the spirit as an extraordinary flawlessness!
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